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In the past twenty years, historians have greatly enriched our knowledge of the 
eighteenth-century ideas that underlie the Constitution. Much of this scholarship has 
been devoted to rediscovery of eighteenth century "republicanism" and an examina-
tion of its role in the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. Some legal schol-
ars, including Frank Miche/man, Cass Sunstein, and Mark Tushnet, have begun to 
explore the implications of republicanism for modern constitutional law. Yet, for 
most teachers of constitutional law, the historical literature on republicanism has 
been unfamiliar and fairly inaccessible. The following anicle, which is an adaptation 
of the introductory chapter of a fonhcoming textbook on the history of the Constitu-
tion, •• attempts to synthesize the historical literature. We reprint it here in the hope 
that readers will be encouraged not only to think about the relevance of the "new 
learning" to contemporary constitutional concerns. but also to explore the historical 
works for themselves. 
The historical roots of the American Constitution begin in 
Britain. The Magna Carta was Britain's only written form of con-
stitution for almost five hundred years, from 1215 until the 1689 
Bill of Rights. During those centuries a tradition of constitutional-
ism nevertheless flourished. Those opposed to the exercise of royal 
or parliamentary authority often based their arguments on Britain's 
unwritten "ancient constitution," or common law, custom, and tra-
dition. They sought to establish that the king's own powers were 
derived from, and thus subordinate to, this earlier law. Though 
these arguments were usually unsuccessful, the notion of constitu-
tional limitations on governmental authority became part of English 
rhetoric and political philosophy. By the beginning of the seven-
teenth century, appeal to the "ancient constitution," which had al-
legedly existed since "time immemorial," was a standard form of 
political argument. 
The momentous events of the seventeenth century catapulted 
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English constitutionalism into the modem era, but in forms ulti-
mately unacceptable to the American colonists. The Interregnum, 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (ending the reign of the Stuarts), 
and the 1689 Bill of Rights and its companion acts, settled both the 
limits on royal prerogative and the absolute supremacy of Parlia-
ment. Limited government came to mean the Crown limited by 
Parliament and the rights of the people safeguarded by the vaunted 
"mixed constitution." A balance among the monarchic (Crown), 
aristocratic (Lords), and democratic (Commons) elements was 
thought to ensure the preservation of liberty, and no further checks 
on parliamentary supremacy were thought necessary. The British 
constitution was thus both a description of existing institutions-
including laws, customs, and traditions as well as the balance of 
power-and a declaration of fundamental principles. Neither as-
pect of the constitution served much to limit Parliament. 
Throughout this period, political philosophers tried to spell out 
the principles on which the system was (or in their view should have 
been) based. The Enlightenment's rationalist rejection of the divine 
right of kings, Cromwell's assumption of power, and the Glorious 
Revolution's ouster of the Stuarts, opened new avenues for discus-
sion about notions of sovereignty and power. Competing visions of 
both the basis for or origin of sovereignty (was sovereignty based on 
raw power or consent of the governed?) and its ultimate location 
(did it reside in Parliament or in the constitution?), led Hobbes and 
Locke, Blackstone and Bolingbroke, Harrington and Montesquieu, 
to devise and refine intricate and conflicting theories of government 
based on rational Enlightenment principles, rather than on the pre-
Enlightenment religious tradition. 
The American colonies, settled in the early seventeenth cen-
tury and coming of political age in the eighteenth, thus inherited 
diverse and sophisticated theories of government. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, however, American development and interpre-
tation of these political theories began to diverge from their British 
sources. Although the Americans relied heavily on British think-
ers, they were selective in their philosophical inspirations and radi-
cal in their applications. 
Three basic circumstances shaped the prism through which the 
colonists viewed British political philosophy: political exclusion, 
geographic situation, and the resulting perception of cultural uni-
queness. Together, these factors allowed (and sometimes de-
manded) that Americans develop their own political culture. 
The colonies' political and geographic isolation led them, 
sometimes in spite of their own intentions, to establish cohesive 
1988] REPUBLICANISM 325 
communities that were often more egalitarian than the relatively hi-
erarchical English structures. It led them, especially after the mid-
1760s, to favor theories that stressed natural law rather than civil or 
socially-created law, in order to dispute the validity of their political 
dependency. It led them to embrace English opposition theories 
that rejected the conventional view of absolute legislative 
supremacy. It evoked a new emphasis on a "constitution" as a lim-
iting principle, gradually superseding its traditional character as a 
description. It enabled them to adopt Enlightenment rationalism 
with enthusiasm by ignoring or rejecting aspects inconsistent with 
their circumstances. 
Separated from England by a vast ocean, confident that the 
continent would yield virtually unlimited land, and oppressed by 
English rule but largely unencumbered by the political realities of 
large-scale self-government, the colonists came to view themselves 
and their institutions as uniquely virtuous and uniquely rational-
and in particular peril from the corrupting force of England. Echo-
ing the sentiments of many of his countrymen, John Adams wrote 
in 1765: 
The liberties of mankind and the glory of human nature is in their keeping. 
America was designed by Providence for the theatre on which man was to make his 
true figure, on which science, virtue, liberty, happiness, and glory were to exist in 
peace. I 
By the 1760s, this divergence of colonial political theory from 
its British antecedents began pointing ineluctably in the direction of 
separation from Great Britain. By the time of the Revolution, the 
American social and political structure so differed-in both the 
ideal and the real forms-from that of Great Britain, that Ameri-
cans could view themselves as restoring rather than destroying, 
maintaining rather than altering, political liberty and the social or-
der through revolution. This essay tells the story of these interwo-
ven strands of political philosophy and their uniquely American 
interpretations. It is the story that forms the background against 
which the American Constitution was written and ratified. 
Contemporary historians disagree about the amount of influ-
ence various philosophical sources exerted on Americans between 
1760 and 1787. Until the late 1960s, most historians thought that 
the philosophical inspiration for the American Revolution came al-
most solely from the work of John Locke. The Constitution was 
similarly seen primarily as a product of Lockean liberalism. De-
pending on the historian's own political views, the Constitution was 
I. DiARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 282 (L. Butterfield, L. Faber & W. 
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sometimes described as a selfish attempt to protect private property 
and sometimes as the brilliant start of the capitalist individualism 
that made America great, but always as traceable almost directly to 
John Locke. 
Beginning in 1967 with the publication of Bernard Bailyn's 
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, historians be-
gan identifying additional philosophical sources for both the 
Revolution and the Constitution. For the last two decades, many 
historians have argued that classical republicanism, especially in the 
form passed down through English Opposition thought of the sev-
enteenth and early eighteenth century, had a greater intellectual in-
fluence on the American Revolution. While this "republicanism" 
(both "republicanism" and "liberalism" are defined later in this es-
say) is currently the predominant school of thought, some histori-
ans still stress Locke's influence to a greater or lesser degree. 
Moreover, there is great debate about the timing of the transforma-
tion from classical republicanism to Lockean liberalism; some his-
torians believe it was virtually complete by 1787 and others contend 
that even today America is still at least somewhat republican. 
In this essay, I have chosen to present a version of the most 
popular historiographical approach: that classical republicanism 
was the most significant influence until after the Revolution, but by 
1787 Lockean liberalism overshadowed republican sentiment. I 
have also tried, however, to give fuller descriptions of the various 
influences in order to allow readers to draw their own conclusions 
in tracing the different schools of thought reflected in our political 
and constitutional system. 
Eighteenth-century political writers could draw on a familiar 
but diverse body of works. This diversity is perhaps best illustrated 
by the contents of Thomas Jefferson's library. Jefferson was almost 
certainly the best-read American of the eighteenth century. His li-
brary contained almost 5000 volumes in 1815 when he sold the en-
tire collection to the Library of Congress. It is a tribute to him, and 
an illustration of the many influences on the American Constitu-
tion, that his library contained the work of every writer mentioned 
in this essay. While his collection was unique, it contained works 
that were well-known sources of inspiration for many Americans. 
Speaking the eighteenth-century language of corruption and con-
spiracy, of virtue and vigilance, Americans drew on a multitude of 
philosophical sources to construct their own science of politics. 
They learned perhaps the most from the "Country" or Opposi-
tion party of England. Members of that party, which existed in var-
ious forms from the early seventeenth century through the 
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tumultuous period of the American Revolution, looked primarily to 
James Harrington (the author of a 1656 Utopian tract titled The 
Commonwealth of Oceana) for their ideas. Elements of Harring-
ton's philosophy can be traced back through Niccolo Machiavelli to 
the ancient republics, and forward through John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon (the authors of Cato's Letters, published between 
1720 and 1724), Viscount Bolingbroke (Henry Saint-John) and 
James Burgh. Throughout most of the seventeenth century, the 
Opposition party consisted primarily of Whigs opposed to royal en-
croachments on parliamentary authority. After the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 removed the Stuarts, put the Whig party in 
power, and established the supremacy of Parliament, the "Country" 
party included those few Whigs who felt not enough had been done, 
and some Tories who opposed the new "Court" party now in 
power. 
Variously called Old Whigs, Real Whigs, and Com-
monwealthmen, the Opposition party had few adherents in Great 
Britain after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Whig ideas were tre-
mendously influential in America, however: in the pamphlets that 
served as the primary vehicle of popular political expression during 
both the pre-Revolutionary period and the ratification struggle after 
the Constitutional Convention, many writers took either Whiggish 
pseudonyms or, in imitation of the English Whigs, classical ones. 
A related source of American political ideas was the Continen-
tal Enlightenment philosophers. Only Montesquieu and Rousseau 
are well known today, but Americans also read and relied on such 
forgotten Enlightenment figures as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and 
Burlamaqui. Montesquieu-who was the most frequently cited of 
any philosopher during the ratification period-in turn drew on the 
English Bolingbroke as well as on his own Continental 
contemporaries. 
One of the more influential philosophers is also one of the most 
difficult to categorize. John Locke, whose Two Treatises of Govern-
ment was first published in 1690, has been allied both with and 
against some of the Old Whigs. He has been hailed as the spirit of 
1776 but not of 1787, as the spirit of 1787 in contrast to 1776, of 
both and of neither. His work has been praised as bringing the En-
lightenment to America, castigated as leading Americans into a 
narrow and short-sighted vision of politics, and relegated to the sta-
tus of a minor influence on the revolutionary or constitutional peri-
ods. Whether or not Americans drew their inspiration directly 
from his writings, Locke's ideas wound through American thought 
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of both periods. Different aspects of his theories were prominent at 
different times. 
Finally, Americans looked to the magnificent English common 
lawyers: Coke, Bracton, and Blackstone. From the early seven-
teenth century to the eve of the Revolution, Americans could turn 
to these English lawyers, judges, and commentators for a principled 
historical explication of English common law. Many prominent 
figures of the Revolution and more than half the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention were lawyers or legally trained-and to 
Americans in the latter half of the eighteenth century, to be legally 
trained meant to be steeped in the thought of English common law. 
The most important lesson Americans learned from the common 
lawyers, however, was methodological rather than substantive. 
They admired Blackstone's Commentaries, for example, not so 
much for its content as for its scientific method of drawing general 
principles from the vast body of judicial decisions. 
These different strands of thought contained myriad variations 
and nuances, and were often inconsistent with one another. Ameri-
cans added their own inventions. From this seamless web grew 
more theories, with different patriots espousing different views at 
different times. The history of the American Constitution is in large 
part the history of ideas. The rest of this essay surveys the ideas 
that inspired America between 1774, when the Revolution began to 
seem inevitable, and 1787, when fifty-five men sat down in Philadel-
phia to write a constitution. 
I 
For most eighteenth-century Americans, politics could be re-
duced to its essential character: a constant struggle between power 
and liberty. They looked at history-at the history of the ancient 
republics, at the history of Europe, and, increasingly, at the history 
of England-and saw a pattern of government tyranny stifling the 
liberty of the people. The source of this tyranny was corruption. 
Until the early 1770s, Americans considered themselves fortunate 
to be under English rule, for the English "mixed constitution" was 
a safeguard against corruption. More and more influenced by the 
"Country" party, however, Americans began to see corruption even 
in England. In 1774, a writer in the Philadelphia Pennsylvania 
Packet described the English constitution as "the mighty ruin of a 
once noble fabrick. "z Such was the result of corruption. 
2. Philadelphia Pennsylvania Packet, Aug. 8, 1774, quoted in G. Wooo, THE CREA-
TION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776·1787, at 32 (1969). 
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Primarily derived from Opposition theory, the term corruption 
did not have only the rather limited meaning that we assign it to-
day, of moral subversion. It meant virtually any distortion of the 
proper balance of power, orchestrated by forces within the govern-
ment. Any part of government could become corrupt. Parliament 
was corrupt when it became dependent on the King, whether that 
dependency arose from individual indebtedness or institutional sub-
ordination. Evidence of the Crown's corruption lay in its increasing 
use of patronage, ministerial persuasiveness and electoral influ-
ence-rather than the constitutionally mandated (but clumsy) "pre-
rogative"-to achieve its goals notwithstanding parliamentary 
objections. A writer in the Boston New England Chronicle de-
scribed royal corruption: 
It is upon this principle that the King of Great-Britain is absolute; for though he 
doth not act without the parliament, by places, pensions, honours and promises, he 
obtains the sanction of the parliament for doing as he pleases. The ancient form is 
preserved, but the spirit of the constitution is evaporated. 3 
The language of the colonists, like the writings of the Opposition 
party, was peppered with code words for the symptoms of corrup-
tion: placemen, standing armies, bishops, aristocrats, luxury, mo-
nopolies, stock-jobbers. Although each term originally had a 
specific meaning, they came to be used almost as epithets, hurled at 
enemies for their emotive effect. 
Although English and American Whigs thought that power 
tended inevitably toward corruption, the corrosive effect of corrup-
tion was not viewed as random or unchanneled. Taught by the En-
lightenment to reject the workings of Providence as a sufficient 
explanation, eighteenth-century writers blamed the ways of men. 
Americans, like their "Country" teachers, saw in the English gov-
ernment a deliberate conspiracy against liberty. Thomas Jefferson 
wrote of "a deliberate, systematical plan of reducing us to slavery."4 
William Henry Drayton described "a conspiracy against the rights 
of humanity."s As every modem criminal lawyer knows, the exist-
ence of a conspiracy allows every false move to be branded as a high 
crime. Thus the American colonists were suspicious or "jealous" of 
every parliamentary or royal act, however minor, that might be 
taken as a step in the conspiracy. 
Good Whigs on both sides of the Atlantic knew that certain 
3. Boston New England Chronicle, Sept. 5, 1776, quoted in G. Wooo, supra note 2, at 
33-34. 
4. Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America (1774), in I PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 125 (Julian Boyd ed. 1955) (hereinafter PAPERS OF JEFFERSON). 
5. Charge to the Grand Jury, Charleston, Apr. 23, 1776, quoted in G. Wooo, supra 
note 2, at 39. 
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forms of government provided some protection against corruption. 
Any device that made the legislature more accountable to its con-
stituents offered some hope. Members of the Opposition party 
called for shorter parliamentary sessions, which would have af-
forded a more frequent opportunity for the electors to throw out 
corrupt legislators. They also demanded the right to instruct their 
representatives, in order to control their votes on particular issues. 
Another method of discouraging legislative corruption lay in 
the nature of the legislature itself. The English Parliament had, 
over the centuries, become less directly representative. Rather than 
a group of individual members speaking for their local constituents, 
Parliament had become a national legislature. Edmund Burke de-
scribed it favorably: 
Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the 
whole, where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the gen-
eral good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.6 
Burke's theory was especially grating to the colonists, because it 
served as a justification for their exclusion from Parliament. Fol-
lowing Burke, England could argue that Americans did not need 
direct representation in Parliament because they had "virtual repre-
sentation": members of Parliament were in fact looking out for co-
lonial interests although not actually elected by the colonies. 
Most Americans, following the "Country" rejection of Burke's 
deliberative assembly, held instead that representatives in Parlia-
ment were "creatures" only of the constituents who elected them, 
and were strictly accountable to those electors. The colonies thus 
rejected the British theory of "virtual representation." In creating 
their own colonial assemblies, they tried to avoid a Burkean legisla-
ture. As a result, colonial assemblies were condemned by their Brit-
ish contemporaries as 
plain illiterate husbandmen, whose views seldom extended farther than to the regu-
lation of highways, the destruction of wolves, wildcats, and foxes, and the advance-
ment of the other little interests of the particular counties which they were chosen 
to represent. 7 
Despite the American rejection of virtual representation, however, 
colonial assemblies were badly malapportioned. 
"Country" ideology also recommended another device to 
guard against distortion of the balance of government: strict sepa-
6. E. Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, quoted in B. BAIL YN, THE IDEOLOGI· 
CAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 163 (1967). 
7. Smith, History of the Late Province of New York. from its Discovery to ... 1762, 4 
CoLLECTIONS OF THE NEW-YORK HISTORICAL SociETY FOR THE YEAR 1829, at 309 
(1829), quoted in B. BAILYN, supra note 6, at 165. 
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ration of powers. Both Bolingbroke and Montesquieu spoke of the 
independence of the different branches of government, and often 
suggested that keeping the functions of each branch separate would 
help prevent mingling of power and the resulting loss of liberty. 
The "mixed constitution," by contrast, established a more interac-
tive system of checks and balances. Each branch represented a dif-
ferent segment of society (the Crown, the aristocracy, and the 
masses) rather than exercising a different function. Restraint and 
harmony, for the dominant English party (the "Court" party), 
came from the relations among the personnel and constituencies of 
the different branches of government. Americans preferred Mon-
tesquieu's vision of separate functions. Americans thus believed 
that the English constitution did not sufficiently guard against cor-
ruption. Again, however, the theory was an imperfect representa-
tion. In both Montesquieu's description of an ideal constitution, 
and early American practice, the authority and powers of each 
branch were not rigidly separate. 
Corruption not only destroyed the liberties of a people, it 
sapped their strength. A polity subverted by corruption was unable 
to repel foreign invasions or to protest further subversion of the 
constitution by the government. Once enslaved by a corrupt re-
gime, a republic ceased to exist. Ancient Greek and Roman repub-
lics, and contemporary Polish and Danish republics, had perished 
in this way. By the early 1770s, Americans were certain that the 
English republic was in imminent danger of the same fate. They 
thus rebelled to save themselves from the English conspiracy 
against liberty. 
If corruption was the predator, liberty was the victim. Liberty 
meant many things, and in speaking of it Americans often used the 
ideas not only of Opposition thinkers but of Locke and Montes-
quieu. Sometimes they fused these into a single, value-laden con-
cept with interchangeable meaning and great rhetorical effect. 
When Patrick Henry galvanized Virginians by demanding liberty or 
death, his listeners could interpret his words as encompassing a 
number of interrelated ideas. 
The simplest meaning of liberty was individual liberty, namely 
the capacity to exercise natural rights. Even that definition, how-
ever, concealed basic ambiguities. With their focus on the looming 
destruction of natural rights, neither the English nor the American 
Whigs spent much time describing the rights themselves. The sec-
ond of Cato's Letters, the Opposition tract read by virtually every 
literate American of the period, said that liberty was "the Power 
which every man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy 
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the Fruit of his Labour, Art, and Industry."s Various writers iden-
tified the right to conscience (primarily religious liberty) as an ina-
lienable right. All the rights protected by the English common law 
and "ancient constitution"-including jury trials and other proce-
dural protections, and some freedom of speech-were held to be 
inalienable rights. In part, eighteenth-century natural lawyers did 
not need to specify particular rights because they believed them to 
be self-evident, or, in historian Bernard Bailyn's words, "inherent in 
people as such, ... [and] distilled from reason and justice."9 
Perhaps the most thorough discussion of natural rights avail-
able to the founding generation was Locke's account of natural law. 
According to Locke, in the state of nature (prior to political society 
and government), all men began as equals: equally free from being 
under the authority of another, and equally vulnerable to the "inva-
sion" of another. This vulnerability and the consequent disruption 
of men's natural liberty led men to leave the state of nature and 
enter into a compact to form civil or political society. In entering 
into the social compact, men ceded to their governors some rights. 
There are, however, certain natural and inalienable rights that can-
not be ceded. 
From this account of the origins of political society Locke de-
rived his theory of government. Government is a compact with lim-
ited purposes and limited effects. For classical republicans-most 
typified in this instance by Aristotle--government and society are 
not distinct, but merge into a single concept: a "regime," with per-
vasive involvement in the lives of citizens. For Locke, in contrast, 
the only legitimate purpose of government is the purpose for which 
it is formed: to protect citizens in the enjoyment of their natural 
and inalienable rights. These rights include, to a greater or lesser 
extent, life, liberty-in a narrower sense than the general capacity 
to exercise all natural rights-and property. 
But what did Locke mean by life, liberty, and property? Cer-
tainly Americans took him to include freedom of conscience and 
freedom from arbitrary laws. Locke also noted that even after en-
tering into the civil compact, each man still has "Liberty to dispose, 
and to order his Person, Actions, Possessions and his whole prop-
erty, within the Allowance for those Laws under which he is." 10 
Thus liberty in society is somewhat narrower than it is in the state 
of nature. Regardless, the right to self-preservation never can be 
8. 2 J. TRENCHARD & T. GORDON, CATO's LETTERS 245 (1723). 
9. B. BAILYN, supra note 6, at 77. 
10. J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 341-42 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d 
ed. 1698). 
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legitimately stifled, although it is possible to read Locke as allowing 
government to limit the means by which this right can be exercised. 
Locke's theory of property rights is especially complex. 
Although each man has a natural right to the fruits of his own la-
bor, there are limits to the amount that any individual may accumu-
late. Property is originally given to man (by God) in common. It is 
only by his own labor that a man acquires individual property 
rights. Labor thus became the basis for all property rights, and 
Locke saw two limits on acquisition: no individual can acquire 
more property than he can improve by his labor, nor more than he 
can use. Nothing should be allowed to spoil, or "perish ... use-
lessly."tt Moreover, Locke's premises that man must live in soci-
ety, and that the principle of self-preservation necessarily implies 
the preservation of society, led him to attach the proviso that a man 
can only acquire property by his labor if "there is enough, and as 
good left in common for others."t2 
The Lockean theory of limited acquisition was consistent with 
other influences on American ideology. Many eighteenth-century 
thinkers considered property a political or civil right, rather than an 
inalienable natural right. An early English radical declared in 1647: 
The Law of God doth not give me property, nor the Law of Nature, but prop-
erty is of human constitution. I have a property and this I shall enjoy. Constitution 
founds property.13 
Government regulation of property rights-sometimes to the point 
of confiscation-was thus permissible and extensive. In the New 
England colonies, for example, public post roads were established 
by narrowing existing privately-owned throughways, and then giv-
ing back to the owners the strips obtained by the narrowing. As 
historian Forrest McDonald has described it, the colonial govern-
ment "compensated landowners for taking part of their land by let-
ting them keep the remainder of their land."t4 
Locke's limits on property rights were especially comfortable 
for the American colonists because that side of Locke mirrored a 
more important influence on American definitions of liberty: classi-
cal republicanism. According to prevailing "County" ideology of 
classical republicanism, the purpose of property ownership was to 
II. Id. at 318. 
12. /d. at 306. 
13. Speech by Henry Ireton (1647), quoted in J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN Mo-
MENT: FLORENTINE POLmCAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 
375 (1975). 
14. F. McDoNALD, NOVUS 0ROO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CoNSTITUTION 23 (1985). 
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benefit the community as a whole rather than the individual owner. 
Owning land instilled in the owner many of the virtues necessary 
for active citizenship: an attachment to the community, self-suffi-
ciency, stability, and wisdom. Thus Jefferson advocated abolishing 
primogeniture (whereby only the oldest son could inherit real prop-
erty), in order to broaden the base of citizenship. Land ownership, 
when accompanied by labor and improvement, also benefited the 
community by increasing productivity and plenty. Since land own-
ership was primarily for the benefit of the community, individual 
owners were expected to obey the community's regulations. 
Thus both Locke and the "Country" party writers found some 
government regulation of property appropriate. The apparent con-
gruence between their views, however, is misleading; the differences 
are more significant than the similarities. Where Locke emphasized 
individual rights as the basis for natural law, classical republican or 
"Country" thought subordinated individual liberty to the needs of 
the communi~y (although the needs of the community sometimes 
called for the exercise of individual liberty). The Continental En-
lightenment philosophers also wrote copiously on natural law and 
natural rights, but again from a more community-oriented perspec-
tive. With their primarily classical outlook, most Americans-at 
least through the late 1770s-selectively embraced the less individ-
ualist aspects of Locke. This emphasis may have changed some-
what by 1787, as we shall see. But during the colonial and early 
independent era, the classical outlook also led Americans away 
from specific definitions of the content of natural rights. Individual 
liberty was rarely defined more specifically than (in the words of 
one revolutionary American) "a power of acting agreeable to the 
laws which are made and enacted by the consent of the PEOPLE, 
and in no ways inconsistent with the natural rights of a single per-
son, or the good of the society."ts 
Thus colonial Americans rarely defined the content of natural 
rights because defining anything in terms of individual rights was 
something of a rarity. Another reason that natural rights were not 
well defined in the 1760s and 1770s is that individual liberty was, 
for many, not as important as another meaning of liberty: civil or 
political liberty. Political liberty was essentially the right of the 
people to participate in self-government. Even a cursory glance at 
the Declaration of Independence, for example, reveals that the 
rights demanded and the injuries protested are primarily public, not 
private. The grievances include the King's various interferences 
15. John Allen, The Watchman's Alarm to Lord N-h (1774), quoted in B. BAILYN, 
supra note 6, at 77. 
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with legislative attempts to pass laws that are "wholesome and nec-
essary for the public good" and his obstruction of justice. 
The theory, then, was that the greater the diffusion of political 
liberty, the more ideal the society. Americans viewed their society 
as more naturally adapted to liberty. American society was in fact 
somewhat more egalitarian than most European nations, and prop-
erty (a republican prerequisite for political citizenship) was more 
broadly distributed. The existence of slavery was essentially ig-
nored. The colonists felt-any evidence to the contrary notwith-
standing-both uniquely free and in unique danger from the 
English threat to political liberty. 
Political liberty in a republic was, moreover, inextricably inter-
twined with the purposes of republican government. At this point, 
some terminology must be clarified. The term "republican" has two 
different meanings. Eighteenth-century Americans used "republic" 
or "republican form of government" merely to describe the form of 
government: a republic was the antithesis of a monarchy. Twenti-
eth-century historians, however, use "republican" (especially when 
modified by the adjectives "classical" or "Jeffersonian") to describe 
a whole school of thought that was prevalent at the time. The dis-
cussion of property rights shows that classical republican or "Coun-
try" ideology differed significantly from the liberalism of Locke. 
Note that "liberalism" also has a somewhat specialized meaning: it 
does not refer to the underlying ideology of the modem welfare 
state (one of its modem meanings) but rather to the individualistic 
philosophy derived from Locke that was dominant in the United 
States in the late nineteenth century. 
The problem is that eighteenth-century Americans had no sin-
gle word to describe either their own "Country" or republican out-
look, or its liberal opposite, and so we must use the modem terms. 
In the first sentence in the preceding paragraph, for example, "re-
public" is used in its eighteenth-century meaning, and "republican" 
in its twentieth-century meaning. For the convenience of the 
reader, I will use "republic" only to describe the form of govern-
ment, and "republican" only to label the school of thought. "Lib-
eral" and "liberalism"-which were generally not used in the 
eighteenth century-are used here as the antithesis of republican-
ism, and not in their more common modem political usage. 
Thus a republic (the type of government) can be either liberal 
or republican (depending on whether it is mostly Lockean or mostly 
"Country"). Americans, for example, were influenced by both 
Locke and the classical republicans in demanding changes in the 
form of government. Rejecting a monarchy or a mixed govern-
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ment, they were determined to create a republic, or government 
based on the people. The type of republic they envisioned, however, 
depended on the extent to which they adopted Lockean or "Coun-
try" goals. 
Unlike Locke, who viewed protection of individual liberty as 
the sole purpose of government, classical republicans thought that 
all government "ought to be calculated for the general good ... of 
the community."'6 The public good, not private liberty, was the 
most important goal of republican government. Political liberty 
consisted not only in the capacity to participate in government, but 
also in living under a government that put the good of the commu-
nity ahead of the good of any individual. 
It is here that Locke's emphasis on individual liberty and the 
"Country" or classical republican emphasis on community are most 
in conflict. At least through 1776, however, there was little recogni-
tion of this conflict. American revolutionaries believed only corrupt 
governors, or "idiots or self-murderers" among the people, would 
put selfish interests ahead of the interests of the nation.11 
Despite this somewhat naive belief that conflicting individual 
interests would not seriously hamper pursuit of the communal 
good, the underlying conflict still existed. For Locke, the good of 
the whole was defined by the good of individuals-the more free-
dom individuals had to pursue their own interests, the better off was 
the nation. For republicans, the good of the whole was more than 
the aggregated good of individuals. Classical republicans conceived 
of society in organic terms, rather than in mechanistic terms. The 
whole was therefore more than the sum of its parts; the community 
had its own existence, and its own needs. Political liberty involved 
more than the greatest possible amount of individual liberty. Good 
republican government might transform individuals; good liberal 
(Lockean) government merely protected them. Historian John Dig-
gins has described the difference: 
Between Machiavelli and Locke lies the dilemma of American politics. Classical 
political philosophy aims to discipline man's desires and raise him far above his 
vulgar wants; liberalism promises to realize desires and satisfy wants. The first is 
more noble, the second more attainable. IS 
Much of the American political debate in the first half- century after 
the Revolution centered on this dilemma and solutions to it. 
16. I K. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 431 (1892). 
17. Letter from John Sullivan to Mesech Weare (Dec. 11, 1775}, quoted in G. WooD, 
supra note 2, at 56. 
18. J. DIGGINS, THE LosT SoUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST 
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM 16 (1984). 
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It was in fact political liberty, in all of its manifestations, that 
was most threatened by the corruption of the English constitution 
and the excesses of Parliament. And the means by which Ameri-
cans sought to protect their liberty from the corrupting force across 
the Atlantic was the creation and maintenance of public virtue. 
In 1776, Americans believed that a republic had only one de-
fense against the conspiracy against liberty: the "virtue" of its peo-
ple. As we have seen, political liberty required both public 
participation in government and a government dedicated to the 
public good. Thus the maintenance of political liberty demanded 
that individuals subordinate their private interests to the welfare of 
the community. This willingness to sacrifice private interests to the 
public good was called virtue. John Adams explained the need for 
what he caHe.i "public Virtue" in 1776: 
[P]ublic Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics. There must be a positive Pas-
sion for the public good, the public Interest, Honour, Power, and Glory, established 
in the Minds of the People, or there can be no Republican Government, nor any 
real Liberty. And this public Passion must be Superiour to all private Passions. 
Men must be ready, they must pride themselves, and be happy to sacrifice their 
private Pleasures, Passions, and Interests, nay, their private Friendships and dearest 
Connections, when they Stand in Competition with the Rights of society.19 
Adams believed a republic to be the most fragile form of govern-
ment, requiring constant vigilance against both corruption and lack 
of virtue. 
How did a society cultivate virtue? Americans thought of 
themselves as naturally virtuous due to their circumstances, so they 
did not explore this question as fully as they might have. Their 
"Country" predecessors were too busy lamenting governmental cor-
ruption to spend much time on public virtue. We can, however, 
draw out some common themes. 
Broad distribution of land ownership was essential for creating 
and maintaining a virtuous population, because tilling the land 
made men virtuous. Jefferson was perhaps the most eloquent ex-
positor of this premise: 
Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens. They are the most vig-
owus, the most independent, the most virtuous, and they are tied to their country 
and wedded to it's [sic] liberty and interests by the most lasting bonds.20 
Those who owned land were best able to see firsthand how their 
private interests were bound up with the good of the community. 
19. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (Apr. 16, 1776), in 4 THE PAPERS OF 
10HN ADAMS 124 (R. Taylor & G. Lint eds. 1979). 
20. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JEFFER-
SON, supra note 4, at 426. 
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Despite the fact that many landowners were also slave-owners, Jef-
ferson (himself the owner of many slaves) thought that those with 
property learned the lessons of virtue more easily than those de-
prived of property because the latter lacked a concrete connection 
to the community. The unpropertied class included both those too 
poor to own land and those engaged in trade or commerce rather 
than in farming. According to Jefferson, both groups were inclined 
to be less virtuous than the yeoman farmer. 
Another means of inculcating virtue was education. A people 
could be taught to value liberty and to understand how serving the 
public good served liberty: 
Where learning prevails in a community, liberty of sentiment, and zeal for the pub-
lic good, are the grand characteristicks of the people .... 
If we would maintain our dear boup-ht ri&}lts inviolate, let us diffuse the spirit 
of literature: Thet1 will self int·otest, ,!1;; governing principle of a savage heart, ex-
pand and be transferred into patriotism: Then will each member of the community 
consider himself as belonging to one common family, whose happiness he will ever 
be zealous to promote. 21 
Public virtue also depended on a fundamental premise of 
equality. Eighteenth-century Americans meant many things by the 
term "equality." With Locke, they believed men were born equal 
because, in the most basic sense, none had any superior claim to 
rule over others. Despite its apparent breadth, this eighteenth-cen-
tury egalitarianism was extremely limited. It did not lead many 
Americans to conclude that slavery was wrong. Nor did most 
American republicans extend equality to those who did not partici-
pate in the political process, including women, Indians, children, 
and sometimes those who lacked property qualifications for voting. 
More important, Americans defined equality in a moral sense: 
they believed men to be equally bound by moral duties and equally 
endowed with a moral sensibility. It was this moral equality that 
allowed the American republicans to place their faith in the virtue 
of (some of) the people. Jefferson, for example, stated repeatedly 
that man was innately moral, innately capable of public virtue: 
Man was destined for society. His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this 
object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. 
This sense is as much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling .... 
It may be strengthened by exercise, as may any particular limb of the body.22 
Thus Jefferson, like most of his contemporaries, believed that man's 
21. The Worcester Speculator, in WoRCESTER MAGAZINE, Oct. 1787, repn'nted in 1 
AMERICAN PoLmCAL WRmNG DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 699, 701 (C. 
Hyneman & D. Lutz eds. 1983). 
22. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in 12 PAPERS OF JEF-
FERSON, supra note 4, at 15. 
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inborn moral sensibility might be brought out by the right circum-
stances and the right education. 
There were not many, however, who had the ability-to say 
nothing of the wealth and the leisure-to pursue the development of 
virtue to the extent necessary to sustain a republic. Thus the eight-
eenth-century republicans on both sides of the Atlantic expected 
that a "natural aristocracy" would spring up to govern the country. 
Composed of those with extraordinary talent, the natural aristoc-
racy would exemplify both virtue and restraint. They would put the 
good of the community before their own selfish interests, and thus 
protect liberty from the selfishness of individuals and the corruption 
of governors. At the same time, since they would derive their pre-
eminent role from natural talents rather than from artificial distinc-
tions, they would be in an ideal position to guide and govern the 
masses. 
For revolutionary Americans, as for their "Country" cousins 
and classical republican ancestors, the best basis for a flourishing 
republic was to increase the supply of virtue: to make better people. 
In 1776, this looked like an easy task, because Americans perceived 
themselves to be uniquely virtuous, and therefore uniquely suited to 
a republic. 
[In America] the moral basis of a healthy, liberty-preserving polity seemed already 
to exist in the unsophisticated lives of the independent, uncorrupted, landowning 
yeoman farmers who comprised so large a part of the colonial population.23 
The main threat to this utopia came from outside, from the cor-
rupting force in England. Once the connection to England was sev-
ered, Americans expected their natural virtue would allow them to 
regain the basis for their republic. As the next section shows, they 
were quickly disillusioned. 
II 
When jealousy of their liberty and their virtue led Americans 
to take the extreme step of declaring to a "candid world" their 
grievances and their independence, they entered into the process of 
creating a new government with great enthusiasm but little experi-
ence. In addition to their Opposition politics, the colonial experi-
ence with British rule left the newly independent American people 
with two firm determinations. They would never again be subject to 
a monarch, and they would be careful to enact written constitutions 
to mark the limits of governmental authority. 
Between 1776 and 1778, eleven states drafted new constitu-
23. B. BAILYN, supra note 6, at 51-52. 
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tions-and one of these states, South Carolina, drafted two. By 
1787, two more states had revised their first efforts. In 1777 the 
Continental Congress drafted and submitted to the states the first 
national constitution, the Articles of Confederation, which took ef-
fect in 1781. The colonies' first practical experience with self-gov-
ernment provided an influence that countered some of their 
ideological inheritance. 
The Revolution inspired a public passion that was to confound 
the expectations of those who led it. Between 1776 and 1787 there 
took place what historian Gordon Wood has called "the democrati-
zation of the American mind." The egalitarian and anti-aristocratic 
rhetoric of the revolutionary writers, directed initially at English 
institutions, was taken as the standard of government by an ever 
expanding segment of the public. The reading public, and hence the 
politically active public, expanded to include more than the elite 
ranks of educated gentlemen who had comprised it in the 1760s and 
early 1770s. Self-government, which originally meant rule by a 
small, elite group of the people, gradually came to mean rule by a 
much broader segment of the population. 
In essence, the terms "republic" (rule by the people instead of a 
monarch) and "democracy" (rule by the masses instead ofthe elite), 
which to the revolutionary generation had been similar but severa-
ble, became synonymous in the public mind. Many of the leaders of 
the Revolution were shocked by this merging of two terms which to 
them had opposite connotations: 
For if "republic" conjured up for many the positive features of the Commonwealth 
era and marked the triumph of virtue and reason, "democracy"-a word that de-
noted the lowest order of society as well as the form of government in which the 
commons ruled-was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder and the 
early assumption of power by a dictator. 24 
By the 1780s, politics was no longer the exclusive domain of edu-
cated gentlemen. Moreover, the expected natural aristocracy failed 
to arise, depriving classical republicans of their governing class. 
The new republic, no longer threatened by corruption, faced a 
hitherto neglected danger: "licentiousness." Licentiousness, or an-
archy, occurred when the people abused their power. If the peo-
ple-on whom the republic rested-were selfish individuals who 
put their own interests ahead of those of the community, they could 
wreak havoc on a system that depended on public virtue. Public 
liberty-especially in the sense of a government dedicated to the 
public good-required both a vigilance against governmental cor-
24. /d. at 282. 
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ruption and willingness to sacrifice individual interests. A republic 
thus might perish as easily from its own as unrestrained selfishness 
as from corruption. 
Both English and American Whigs had always warned of the 
dangers of the excesses of democracy, but it did not seem a realistic 
threat until after the Revolution. By the mid-1780s, however, many 
American thinkers were more worried about licentiousness than 
about corruption. Benjamin Rush, an eminent Pennsylvania doc-
tor, commented in 1787: 
In our opposition to monarchy. we forgot that the temple of tyranny has two doors. 
We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but we left the other open, by neglect-
ing to guard against the effects of our own ignorance and licentiousness.25 
The evidence of licentiousness took many forms. It could be 
seen in the economic bickering among the states which sapped the 
war effort and helped cause a peacetime recession in 1785-1786. It 
was manifest in the development of "factions": groups within the 
legislature with different, selfish, interests. The most common ex-
ample of licentiousness was the legislature of Rhode Island, also 
known as Rogue Island. There they carried the trends of other 
states toward debtor relief, paper money, and other popular meas-
ures so far as to propose redistribution of property every thirteen 
years. 
For those who despaired of the people's virtue, the last straw 
was Shays' Rebellion. The economic depression that swept the 
country in 1785-1786 hit rural residents hard. High interest rates 
and a low money supply increased bankruptcies and made it diffi-
cult for farmers to pay their public and private debts. They blamed 
urbanites, and especially the lawyers and the court system, for tak-
ing advantage of rural poverty: "Like Drones they fatten on the 
Lab'rers toil/Defraud the Widow and the Orphans spoil. "26 Farm-
ers thus pressed-unsuccessfully-for various forms of debtor re-
lief, including collection delays, court reforms, increasing the 
money supply (often by state issuance of paper currency), and keep-
ing taxes low. 
The crisis came to a head in rural western Massachusetts late 
in the summer of 1786. There a group of disgruntled farmers, led 
by Daniel Shays, took up arms to demand court reform and debtor 
relief. They drew up a list of grievances and began drilling, but 
were quickly crushed by the militia. Word of the rebellion spread, 
25. Address by Benjamin Rush in Philadelphia (1787), quoted in F. McDONALD, supra 
note 14, at 3. 
26. Aristedes, Boston Gazette, April 17, 1786. quoted in J.T. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDER-
ALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-1788, at 57 (1958). 
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however, and the rebels' cause was further harmed by the exagger-
ated accounts of their intentions. Henry Knox, serving as Superin-
tendent of War, wrote to George Washington that the Shaysites had 
intended to march on Boston, loot the Bank of Massachusetts, and 
then march southward redistributing property. Washington did not 
keep this news to himself, and the rumor spread quickly. The 
whole rebellion-truth and fiction-was viewed by the educated 
elite as an example of the excesses of democracy caused by the de-
cline in virtue. One of Washington's aides condemned the "licen-
tious spirit prevailing among many of the people; a levelling 
principle; a desire of change."27 Abigail Adams wrote to Jefferson 
that "these commotions" (meaning specifically Shays' Rebellion) 
were caused by "Luxery and extravagance. "2s 
As the definition of "the people" was broadened to include 
those with less inclination for virtue--generally those with less 
wealth and education-the paradigm of classical republicanism be-
gan to collapse. No longer confident that the innate (if dormant) 
virtue of the people would triumph, many in the period between 
1776 and 1787 turned away from the whole "Country" worldview 
with its theories of corruption and virtue. If the republican experi-
ment was to be saved, a new theory of government would have to be 
devised, for virtue was in short supply. The problem was no longer 
simply governmental corruption, which would be defeated. The 
problem was that people were inevitably prey to selfishness and self-
interest. Americans had irretrievably lost their virtue. 
Some, of course, remained committed republicans. Although 
often no more democratic than their disillusioned brethren, they re-
tained their faith in the virtue of the people despite disagreement 
with many popular measures. Rather than abandoning republican-
ism, they attempted to create a more virtuous public. America 
could be put on the right track, could regain her virtue, if only the 
proper steps were taken. They continued to advocate Whig meas-
ures and espouse "Country" ideology. Others, however, abandoned 
hope, and turned to alternative theories of government to support 
the republic. This difference of opinion would persist throughout 
the Constitutional Convention and the ratification debates, and 
would influence American politics well into the nineteenth century. 
Those who lost faith in the people did not have to look far for 
inspiration. Locke's liberal individualism provided a ready-made 
27. Letter from David Humphreys to George Washington (Nov. 9, 1786), quoted in 
J.T. MAIN, supra note 26, at 62. 
28. Letter from Abigail Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 29, 1787), in II PAPERS OF 
JEFFERSON, supra note 4, at 86. 
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theory that fit the times perfectly. Montesquieu's theory of separa-
tion of powers contained within it a new counterpoint of checks and 
balances. And a little-known English writer named Bernard Man-
deville provided a springboard for a theory of government based not 
on virtue but on vice. Together, these thinkers allowed disillu-
sioned republicans (now liberals) to construct a new "science of 
politics," basing government not on man as he ought to be but on 
man as he often is: ignoble, self-interested, and ignorant. 
As we have seen, Locke's theory of limited acquisition of prop-
erty was compatible with a republican perspective. His general the-
ory of a limited-purpose government, however, provided an 
alternative to the republican vision of an encompassing regime. It 
could also serve to transform the classical republican community of 
citizens into a modem liberal collection of individuals. 
For classical republicans, the community and the government 
were joined in a common endeavor of promoting individual and 
civil virtue. Law and morality were necessarily intertwined. Thus 
no part of individual life could be marked off as separate from the 
community, and no part of communal life was beyond the reach of 
the government acting on behalf of the community. This was the 
classical vision of government: an integrated "regime" rather than 
a functionally separate "government." Additionally, republicans 
put the community at the center, and saw individuals primarily in 
their role as part of a larger whole. Thus individuals were expected 
to subordinate their private interests to the good of the community. 
Americans saw in Locke's work a way to tum this scheme on 
its head. His derivation of government (political society) from the 
state of nature allowed a conclusion that individuals were prior to, 
and superior to, the societies they formed. Individuals came first; 
their needs and rights were the basis for-and the limits of-polit-
ical society. Thus instead of individuals subordinating their private 
interests to the needs of the community, the very purpose of the 
community was to give individuals the freedom to pursue their pri-
vate interests. Government was thus limited to the purpose for 
which it was formed: protecting individuals from their neighbors' 
viciousness in order to permit them to engage in private pursuits. 
Limiting the role of government to facilitating individual 
desires also meant that law and morality could now be separated. 
The sphere of law now included only protection of individual lib-
erty. It no longer encompassed fostering the private or public virtue 
necessary to public liberty. Lockean liberalism thus transformed 
both the role and the purposes of government. 
Transformations, however, do not happen overnight. Many 
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who turned to Locke still held dear the republican principle of the 
public good. For them, Bernard Mandeville and those who fol-
lowed him provided a theoretical scheme to justify condoning indi-
vidual selfishness without compromising the public good. In 1714 
Mandeville published his Fable of the Bees, which had appeared in a 
shorter version in 1705. Its subtitle was guaranteed to capture the 
imagination of the disillusioned republicans: "Private Vices, Public 
Benefits." 
Mandeville's satirical attack on the "Country" preoccupation 
with virtue purported to show how the selfish and unvirtuous moti-
vations of individual bees still resulted in a productive beehive. 
Millions endeavouring to supply 
Each other's lust and vanity . . . 
Thus every part was full of vice, 
Yet the whole mass a paradise[.]29 
The Fable of the Bees scandalized Mandeville's contemporaries, but 
it had significant influence. Both Adam Smith and David Hume 
denied any reliance on Mandeville, yet their economic and political 
theories clearly owe a debt to his linking of private vices and public 
benefits. Smith explained how individual selfishness might work, as 
if by the workings of "an invisible hand," to promote the public 
economy. 
Hume relied on a similar theory to advocate constructing a 
government based on vice: 
[I]n contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and con-
trouls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no 
other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this interest we must govern 
him, and, by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and 
ambition, co-operate to the public good. 30 
Hume's advice would be taken to heart by many at the Constitu-
tional Convention. 
Neither Hume nor Mandeville, however, explained how consti-
tution writers might turn individual vices into public benefits. It 
was all very well to speculate that a selfish citizen could be induced 
to "co-operate to the public good," but in the absence of civil virtue, 
how could this be accomplished? 
Ever innovative and adaptive, the liberals turned back to Mon-
tesquieu for the new purpose of complementing the theories of 
Locke and Hume. Montesquieu himself would have been horrified. 
He was a thorough-going republican, an admirer of Bolingbroke 
29. B. MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES 30. 33 (D. Garman ed. 1934). 
30. 3 Ht.:ME'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 117-18 (T. Green & T. Grose eds. 1886). 
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who feared only corruption and trusted only virtue. But in his ex-
plication of separation of powers lay the seeds of a more complex 
theory. For those who read carefully Montesquieu's description of 
the ideal form of government-and not merely his general state-
ments about the necessity of separating the branches of govern-
ment-a new doctrine of checks and balances began to emerge. The 
functions of the different branches might be deliberately mingled in 
such a way as to counter, rather than foster, individual ambition 
and lust for power. Montesquieu's ideal government in fact gave 
the three branches of government overlapping power: the legisla-
ture had the impeachment power, and the executive was given a 
negative on the laws. Checks and balances could be redefined as a 
way of mingling power to provide each branch with a safeguard 
against the ambitions and encroachments of the other branches. 
With these rudiments of a structure of government that might 
combat licentiousness, those who despaired of "Country" ideology 
could tum to its opposite: the "Court" party, which had held 
power in England since the Glorious Revolution. This party, like 
many Americans after their own Revolution, was beginning to ex-
plore the possibility of substituting self-interestedness for virtue. 
Unsurprisingly, "Cf"'urt" ideology embodied notions highly offen-
sive to "Country" Whigs: 
Its characteristics were a strong and stable executive representing a guaranteed 
Protestant monarchy in parliament, and a steady diminution of political competi-
tiveness; its means included compromised elections, a Septennial (replacing a Trien-
nial) Act extending the duration of parliaments, and a system of political 
management in which patronage played a visible if not an oversignificant part. 31 
Before the 1780s, almost no patriotic American would endorse such 
a program. By 1787, "Court" ideology, backed up by the liberalism 
of Locke and Hume, was at least as well-represented in the Consti-
tutional Convention as the "Country" party-and probably more 
so. Whiggish republicans, Lockean liberals, and a few stray monar-
chists brought their different visions of government and society to 
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. The Constitution they wrote 
thus reflects the influence of many competing views. How these 
views were translated into a spare and elegant document is another, 
and equally fascinating story. 
31. J. PococK, supra note 13, at 478. 
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